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A BAKERIAN RESPONSE TO WEINSTEIN'S FREE
SPEECH THEORY
Anne Marie Lofaso*
As Professor Jim Weinstein correctly notes, his and Baker's views
about the core value underlying free speech form the main focus of
disagreement between his and Baker's free speech theories.' Whereas Professor
Weinstein thinks that American free speech is committed to participatory
democracy, the basis of Baker's theory is formal autonomy.2
But there is another area of difference between Weinstein and Baker
that is very important-one that Weinstein implicitly recognizes. Whereas
Weinstein appears to be searching for the core value underlying the American
free speech principle, Baker is searching for the core value underlying the best
or the correct free speech principle.3 In this way, Weinstein is a positivist, and
Baker is a natural law theorist. Baker may very well have agreed that
Weinstein's theory better describes American free speech jurisprudence-
though, knowing Ed, I'm quite certain that he would never concede that point.
Baker's project, however, was not only to find a theory that demonstrated some
doctrinal fit. After all, he was a great fan of the Free Speech Clause and
believed that United States jurisprudence had developed a "robust" free speech
doctrine. Baker was also preoccupied with getting it right, which meant finding
a theory that persuasively explains when and how the courts are getting it
wrong.
Along these lines, I agree with Weinstein that Baker places a high
emphasis on normative appeal.4 I just do not think that, for Baker, doctrinal fit
is "irrelevant." Indeed, Baker uses doctrinal fit to help him in the reflective
equilibrium process. Accordingly, where Baker's theory generates a different
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I See James Weinstein, Formal Equality, Formal Autonomy and Political Legitimacy: A
Response to Ed Baker, 115 W. VA. L. REv. 29, 29 (2012).
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result from doctrine, such as is the case with obscenity, Baker would use that
misfit to test or reflect on, and possibly refine, his theory. But perhaps that is
just another way of saying that doctrinal fit is "irrelevant," at least in drawing a
substantive conclusion about the underlying core value of the Free Speech
Clause and the kind of society we wish to reside.
As Weinstein further points out, Baker and he agree to some extent on
the normative underpinnings of the Free Speech Clause.5 Both believe that
political legitimacy helps to resolve an age-old jurisprudential question: Under
what conditions can a government obligate its citizens to obey the law?6 Both
seem to use political legitimacy as a check on policies generated by their
theories.
As Weinstein points out, and Baker would agree with this point, a
legitimate legal system must reflect citizen obedience out of a sense of duty,
not merely out of a sense of fear.8 In this way, both Weinstein and Baker are
very Hartian in their approach to legal legitimacy.
I have some dispute, however, with the question that Weinstein poses:
Do restrictions on speech that interfere with democratic participation
undermine warranted allegiance to the legal system's legitimacy to a greater
extent than do laws that infringe formal autonomy?9 Weinstein's question
assumes that democratic participation is a fundamental value. I think that Baker
would argue that a society built on formal autonomy would necessarily
generate some form of constitutional democracy, which in turn would value
citizen participation in political decision-making; after all, participatory
democracy is the sum of each citizen's actualized formal autonomy. For Baker,
formal autonomy then is prior to participatory democracy, and participatory
democracy depends on formal autonomy.
Moreover, constitutional restraint is built into Baker's definition of
formal autonomy as "a person's authority (or right) to make decisions about
herself-her own meaningful actions and usually her use of her resources-as
long as her actions do not block others' similar authority or rights." 0 Baker's
conception of formal autonomy grants citizens a right, which necessarily means
that governments are under an obligation to uphold that right.
Baker's theory and Weinstein's theory tend to converge in many places
because Baker's theory necessarily generates a constitutionally constrained
democracy and Weinstein's theory is grounded in participatory democracy."
s Id. at 33.
6 Id.
7 Id
8 Id. at 31.
S Id at 32.
10 C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. CoMMENT. 251, 254 (2011).
I See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 29.
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Where Weinstein and Baker might disagree is on the fringes of what that form
of government might or must look like. For Baker, the building blocks for a just
political society must include both formal equality and formal autonomy-
"both [are] basic but do different, non-conflicting work in relation to a
legitimate legal order."' 2 As Steven Shiffrin, interpreting Baker, has put it:
"The building block for [Baker's] theory was that human beings are equally
entitled to be respected by government as autonomous agents. He believed that
people had a right to make their own commitments and live out those
commitments without state interference." 3
There are, therefore, two components of Baker's theory: 1) formal
autonomy,14 which we have devoted the better part of this conference to
discussing, and 2) formal equality.' 5 Baker valued equality of respect,' 6 or what
Ronald Dworkin and Immanuel Kant have called dignity: each human being
must be respected equally on the basis of her inherent worth as a human
being.' 7 My guess is that Weinstein would agree with this constraint. After all,
participatory democracy does seem to entail Kantian dignity. Baker therefore
allowed for a sufficient baseline distribution of resources (material conditions,
which would include "sustenance and shelter and maybe education and medical
care") to allow for meaningful opportunities to lead a self-authored life.' 8 This
is not really substantive equality, although some may differ with me on this
point.
Finally, Weinstein uses the doctrine of defamation to show why his
theory is superior to Baker's.19 There are several responses that Baker could
give to this argument. First, Baker might claim that certain untrue defamation is
simply not protected. Recall that Baker's autonomy theory does not protect
violence, coercion, or manipulation as practices that society must respect.20 In
Baker's view, regulating these practices does not violate the speaker's
autonomy because the speaker's speech or conduct does "not aim to
communicate the speaker's own views or values, . . . but rather attempt[s] to
undermine the integrity of the other person's decisionmaking authority."
12 Baker, supra note 10, at 255.
13 Steven Shiffrin, Eulogy at the Memorial Service Honoring the Life of C. Edwin Baker at
the Cardozo School of Law (Jan. 31, 2010), available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/Doc
Server/SteveShiffrin_-_EdBakerEulogy.pdfdoclD=7983.
14 Baker, supra note 10, at 254.
is Id. at 255.
16 Id.
17 Id
18 Id.
19 Weinstein, supra note 1, at 36-37.
20 Baker, supra note 10, at 255-56.
21 Id. at 256,
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To be fair, this "caveat" will not capture all defamation, which is
perhaps why Baker recognized that defamation is a problem for his theory. 2 2 It
does, however, capture the worst types of defamation, which should be good
enough to demonstrate that even though formal autonomy allows some harms,
it does not permit the worst kind of harms and therefore generates the type of
society to which any of us in the original position might agree.
These observations leave open one question: Who wins this dog
fight-Weinstein's Demo or Baker's Auto? I think it depends on how
foundational you want to get.
22 See id. at 282.
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